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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Decemoer and reported to the defendant, and ended his voyage.
This argument is specious; but it assumes that the vessel had
arrived at the dock or wharf; when, in truth, she had only very
nearly arrived. It has been held in two English eases concerning
cargoes of coals shipped under contracts almost identical with this,
that delays within the port for a considerable time, owing to a want
of sufficient water at -the place of delivery, would not require the
freighter to receive the coals at another place, or cause the lay days
to begin, though the contract had the clause that the ship was to
to go only so near to the place as she could safely get. It was held
that although she could not safely go up while the tides were neap,
yet that was one of the accidents of navigation which a vessel con-
tracting to go to a tidal harbor ran the risk of The distance at
which the ship is kept from her berth by the low water is imma-
terial, if it be so far that the delivery of the cargo is prevented."
We do not advise a new trial.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREMR COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1
SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.
2
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.2
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.'
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.
5
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. See Corporation; Statute.
BILLs AND NOTES. See Evidence.
,ndorser--Waiver of Demand.-While a negotiable note payable on
demand, is by statute dishonored at the end of four months i" not paid,
yet where such a note is on annual or semi-annual interest, it will be
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the endorser
made his endorsement with no expectation that demand of payment
would be made at the end of four months, and therefore with a waiver
of such demand: nayes v. Werner, 45 Conn.
The taking of security by the endorser at the tim6 of the endorse-
ment, is.not in itself a waiver of demand and notice, but it is evidence
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during October Term 1878. The cases will probably be reported in 7 or 8 Otto.
2 From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 45 Connecticut Reports.
3 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 87 Illinois Reports.
4 From Hon. W .C. Webb, Reporter; to appear in 21 Kansas Reports.
5 From John H. Stewart, Esq., Reporter. to appear in 30 N. J. Eq. Reports.
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of it, and goes to fortify the presumption arising on the face of the
note : Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Receitor-Gaods brought into another State-Remedy.-A re-
ceiptor of goods attached, who by his receipt has bound himself to
return the property to the officer upon request or pay damages, is not
a mere naked bailee of the goods, but has a special property in them,
and can maintain replevin against a person unlawfully detaining them
from him: Peters v. Stewart, 45 Conn.
Where goods were attached in the state of Massachusetts, and there
delivered by the officer to a receiptor, who left them in the hands of the
debtor, by whom they were brought to Connecticut and sold, it was
held:-
1. That the law of Connecticut governed upon the question whether
the receiptor could maintain replevin for the goods.
2. That the reciptor was clearly entitled to the immediate possession
of the goods as against the debtor, and that this alone would have been
enough, under the statute in force when the suit was brought, to sus-
tain the action of replevin.
3. That the purchaser of the goods, if he bought them in good faith
of the debtor, could hold them against the receiptor.
4. That the burden of proof was on the purchaser to show that he
bought them in good faith : Id.
CONsTITUTioNA. LAw.
State E istence-Rebellion-Impairing Contrats.-The political so-
ciety which in 1796 was organized and admitted as a state into the
Union, by the name of Tennessee, has remained the same body politic
to this time. Its attempt to separate itself from that Union did not
destroy its identity as a state, nor free it from the binding force of the
Federal constitution: Keith v. Clark, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
Being the same political organization during the rebellion and since
that it was before, an organization essential to the existetce of society,
all its acts, legislative and otherwise, during the period of the rebellion,
are valid and obligatory on the state now, except where they were done
in aid of that rebellion, or are in conflict with the constitution and laws
of the United States, or were intended to impeach its authority: Id.
The state of Tennessee having organized in 1838 the Bank of Ten-
nessee, agreed by a clause in the charter to receive all its issues of circu-
lating notes in payment of taxes, but by a constitutional amendment
adopted in 1865, it declared the issues of the bank during the insur-
rectionary period void, and forbade their receipt for taxes. Hed, that
this was impairing the obligation of the contract: Id.
CORPORATION.
Interference by Attorney- GeneraL-Interference by the attorney-gen-
eral with corporations on the ground of a trust in the government, is
limited to two classes of cases : 1. Religious, charitable, municipal or
other corporations whose functions are solely public, and whose man-
agers have destroyed the fund, or are putting it to improper uses, or
otherwise abusing their functions. 2. Other corporatidns which are
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exercising powers beyond those to which they are limited by the law of
their organization: lUnited States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., S. 0.
U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
EQuI-Y. See Fraud; Limitations.
Control over Contracts made by an nsolvent.-By virtue of an agree-
ment with the owner of certain lands, a railroad company, before paying
the sum stipulated, entered upon the land, built their road thereon, and
included it in a general mortgage of their lands, &o. After their insol-
vency, and the appointment of a receiver by this court, the owner
applied for the payment of the amount. It appearing that the sum
agreed upon was grossly exorbitant, the court refused to order its pay-
ment, but directed that the compensation justly due the owner be ascer-
tained and paid: Coe v. .Midland Railway Co., 80 N. J. Eq.
EVIDENCE.
Parol to vary Writing.-The defendant had given the plaintiff his
note for certain real estate conveyed to him by an absolute deed by the
plaintiff. Held, In a suit on the note, that parol evidence is admissible
on the part of the defendant, to show that the conveyance was not in-
tended as a sale, but was made by the plaintiff for a certain purpose of
his own, and upon an understanding with the defendant, that the land
was afterwards to be conveyed back, and that the note Nas given at the
time under an agreement that it was not to be paid: Schindler v. MuU-
hiser, 45 Conn.
EXECUTOR.
Investments by.-A direction to invest a share "in productive funds
upon good securities," means only those that are designated by law; and
a disregard of such requirement renders the executor personally liable,
in ease of loss or depreciation: Ward v. Kitchen, 30 N. J. Eq.
A specific legacy may remain invested in the stocks set apart and
designated by the testator for the purpose in his will.
An executor, apprehending a depreciation in the stocks in which a
specific legacy is invested, should protect the estate by con-verting them.
FRAUD.
Representations amounting to more than commendaton.-Where rep-
resentations were made by the holder of a mortgage for $7000. that he
had sold the mortgaged premises to the mortgagor for about $50,000;
that it was first-rate property; that the land was good and the timber
thereon valuable; that the land would be more valuable after it was
cleared; that the mortgage was a good mortgage; and that the interest
thereon had been paid regularly-all of which were false and fraudulent.
Held, that they could not be regarded as simple= commendatio; and a
conveyance of lands obtained thereby was set aside: Perkins v. Part-
ridge, 30 N. J. Eq.
Delay in Rescinding-Homestead- Wife's Rights.-The mere delay
of the party who finds himself defrauded in rescinding a fraudulent con-
tract and returning the property he has received under the contract,
does not take away the right, if, in the interval, whilst he is deliberating,
no innocent third party has acquired any interest in the property, and
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the wrongdoer in consequence of the delay, is no way affected injuri-
ously in his position. Wicks v. Smith, 21 Kans.
Vhere there is a verbal contract for the sale of a homestead made by
the husband and wife to another party, with part performance and pos-
session by the purchaser of such homestead, and upon investigation soon
after, it is discovered by husband and wife that they have been greatly
defrauded by the fraudulent representations of the purchaser and on
account of such fraud have the right to avoid the contract. ifeld, as the
homestead cannot be alienated without the joint consent of both husband
and wife, either or both have the right, upon the return of the property
received under the contract, to rescind the contract and any act of the
husband in affirniance or recognition of such fraudulent contract, after
the discovery of the fraud committed, without the consent or knowledge
of the wife, is not binding on her. Id.
GOVEaNMENT. See Corporation; Statute.
HomxsTAD. See Fraud.
Tenants in Common-Rights of Wife-Partition.-Where a person
owns an undivided half of three hundred and twenty acres of farming
land and resides upon and occupies it with his family, consisting of his
wife and children, and an action of partition is brought by the other
tenants in common with him to divide the real estate and have certain
claims of lien-holders adjudged liens against the homestead interest of
such person; Held, that the wife is a necessary party in the action.
Wheat v. Buryems, 21 Kans.
A judgment in such an action decreeing that the one hundred and
sixty acres set off to the husband is subject to certain liens which, if
not paid within a short time, shall be satisfied from the proceeds arising
from a sale of said homestead, is void as against the wife in the
absence of jurisdiction of her person by the court rendering the judg-
ment. Id.
HusBANr AND Wipz. See Fraud; Homestead; Specific Performance.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Demurre-Al- ty-Y ust.--When it clearly appears on the face of
the bill that the complainant's right of action is barred, advantage may
be taken of the Statute of Limitations by demurrer. Partridye v. Wel,
30 N. J. Eq.
The bar of the statute is as perfect an answer in equity as at law, to
actions covered by the statute. Id.
The statute does not apply to such trusts as are not cognisable at law,
and upon which a remedy can only be had in equity. Id.
MANDAMUS.
To compel City to pay Judgment.-Where a judgment is recovered
against a city, a duty rests upon it to pay the same, which may be enforced
by mandamus at the suit of an assignee of the judgment: City of Chi-
cago v. Sansom, 87 Ills.
MuNiCiPAOL ConPOAIor. See Mandamus; Officer
Nqeh'gence- Unsafe Sidewalk.-Where city authorities suffered a
sidewalk upon a frequented street, built some four feet above the ground
to become dilapidated and out of repair for a considerable time, and the
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stringers upon -whic the boards were nailed were rotten, so as not to
hold the nails, and the boards were loose, making the walk dangerous,
and they, after notice of its unsafe condition, did not repair the same, so
as to make it safe, and the plaintiff, while passing over the same with
her child in her arms, stepped upon a short board which gave way,
causing her to fall upon her back, whereby she received an irreparable
injury, and no want of prudence being attributable to her, it was held,
that the right of recovery against the city for the injury was clear:
Ciay of Chicago v. Herz, 87 Ills.
Power to Tax.-A municipal corporation may levy a tax to pay the
expense of collection, and to meet deficiencies likely to occur, over and
above the sum actually required to pay its debts; and when this is
done by the corporate authorities, in the fair and honest exercise of the
discretion vested in them, the courts will not interfere: Village of .yde
Park v. Ingalls, 87 Ills.
NEGIGENCE. See Munidcpal Cbroration; Railroad.
OFc AND OFFICER.
Salary-Actual Possession of Offce-Policeman.-A person is not
entitled to the salary of a public office unless he both obtains and exer-
cises the office: Farrell v. City of.Bridgport, 45 Conn.
A policeman of a city is a public officer, holding his office as a trust
from the state, and not as a matter of contract between himself and the
city: Id.
se of .irm Funds by one Partner-Land so Purclased.-Property
purchased by one copartner with the funds of the firm, and title taken
in the name of his wife, is partnership assets : Partridge v. Wells, 30
X. J. Eq.
Assignment.-Where a voluntary assignment is executed by L. & B.,
who are partners in the grocery business, and signed by their respective
wives, who release all right, title and interest in the real estate thereby con-
veyed, and the assignment purports to assign and transfer all the property
of L. & B. of every kind and description, excep't that exempt by law; and
provides that from the proceeds of the property when sold, the assignee
shall pay and discharge and pay all debts of L. & B., but if not suffi-
cient therefor to pay rateably in proportion to the amount of the indebt-
edness, without distinction or preference; Held, That said assignment
is general and conveys the partnership effects of the partners and
their separate property, notwithstanding that where the names of L. &
B. appear in the body of the written instruments, they are immediately
followed by" co-partners" or "c partners :" WTliams v. Hadley, 21 Kans.
POSSESSION.
Unrecorded Deed--Notice-Execution-Euitable T'tle.-A person
in actual possession of real estate under-an unrecorded deed is, as against
all persons who have actual notice of such deed, the legal and absolute
owner of such real estate, and as against all other persons, he is the
equitable owner: TYutker v. Vandermar and Kirtland, 21 Kans
All persons are bound to take notice of all equitable interests any per-
son may have in real estate, of which he is in actual possession- Id.
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An attachment cannot be made to operate upon a merely leat title, as
against the equitable owner of real estate, where the parties claiming under
the attachment have (at the time the attachment is levied,), or are bound
by law to take notice of the paramount outstanding equitable title. Id.
PUBLIC SALE.
Mortgage Sale--3ransfer of Bid.-It is often the case, a bidder at a
public sale transfers his bid to another, and directs the deed to be made
to such person, and if there be no fraud in the transaction, and no loss
to the mortgagor thereby, there can be no objection. But if objection-
able, it cannot be set up in an action of ejectment against remote
purchasers without notice: Johnson v. Wa4son, 87 Ills.
I RAILROAD.
Negligence.-Where a plaintiff carelessly walked upon the track of a
railroad only a few steps south of an approaching train, without looking
north to see if there was danger, and paid so little heed as not to hear
the bell or whistle when sounded, or notice the calls of persons warning
him of danger, and was run over by the engine, not moving at a high
rate of speed, and there was no proof that the servants of the company
wantonly or wilfully caused the injury, it was held, that the plaintiffs
negligence was so gross as to preclude a recovery of damages by him, in
a suit against the company; L. S. & Mzic. Southern Railroad Co. v.
Hart, 87 ills.
REBzmION. See C nstitonal Law.
RzcEIPoR. See Coif/Zict of Laws.
RECErvzR. See Equity.
SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Against Wife of Yendor.-It is erroneous, in decreeing the specifie
performance of a contract for the conveyance of land, to require the
wife of the vendor to write in the conveyance, and, on her failure, for
the master to convey her interest in the land, where the has not signed
the agreement -with her husband, or otherwise contracted to convey any
interest she might have in the premises: .Mathlison v. Wilson, 87 Ills.
STATUTE.
Specpal Act directing Suit to be brought by Attorney- General.-Stat-
utes directing suits for specific objects to be brought by an Attorney.
General, and regulating the proceedings in them, are very common, such
as quo warranto, or bill in equity against corporations to test the right
to the exercise of their franchises, or declare them forfeited, or if insol-
vent to wind up their business and distribute their assets, and their
validity has uniformly been recognised: United States v. Union Pacifia
Railroad Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1878.
TITLE. See Possession; Vendor.
TRESPASS.
Assaut-Provocation.-In trespass for an assault the provocation
given by the plaintiff, though offered in evidence in justification of the
assault, may yet, if insufficient for this purpose, be considered by the
jury in mitigation of damages : Burke v. Mdvin, 45 Conn.
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Ani it makes no difference that the plea is the general issue, with
notice only that the fasts would be proved as a justification : Id.
TRUST. See Limitations, Statute of.
Trust created by Widow taking Deed of Lands sold ner Husband.-
Where a purchaser of land died without completing his payments, and
afterwards the vendor, without manifesting any desire or intention to
declare a forfeiture of the contract, under a clause giving him such
right resold one.half of the lot to a third person and the other half to
the widow-of the original purchaser, for the exact sum then due on the
first contract, and the half sold to the widow was worth considerably
more than the price paid by her, and shle, on the payment, obtained a
conveyance : Held, there was no forfeiture declared, and that she took
the legal title in trust for the heirs at law of her husband: .Ausham v.
Husham, 87 Ills.
USURY.
'What wVl not Amount to -When an agent procuring a loan of money
for a palty, charged and received from the borrower five per cent. of
the amount, and $100 for going to Chicago and procuring a release of
an incumbrance, the party making the loan having no knowledge of this
arrangement and deriving no benefit from it, it was held, that usury
could not be predicated of the transaction. Balinqer v. Bowland, 87 Ills.
UNITED STATES. See Cor2oration; Statute.
UNITED' STATES COURTS.
Supreme Cburt-Review of Decisions of State Courts.-Wbere a case
has been decided in an inferior court of a state on a single point which
would give this court jurisdiction, it will not be presumed here that the
Supreme Court of the state decided it on some other ground not found
in the record, or suggested in that court: Keith v. Clark, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1878.
YPNDou AND PUROrrASER. See Traud.
Sale of Land without Title-Subseguent Acquisition of Title by Ven-
dor.-A mere trespasser on lands sold certain improvements he had
placed thereon and delivered the possession of the land and the improve-
ments to his vendee. Subsequently he bought the title to the land.
Held, it not appearing that he had given any deed or made any war-
ranty or any fllse representations, that he was not estopped from recov-
ering possession of the land from a vendee of his vendee. Sheffidd v.
Griffin, 21 Kans.
WILM.
Devise of Fnd to be divided between Children where there are more
than two.-T. gave to the children of D. a part of his residuary estate, to
be equally divided between them as they should respectively come to tlp
age of twenty-one years. At the time of making the will and of T.'s
death, D. had two children, but before the elder came of age, another
child 'vas born, and all three are living, and the eldest has attained to
majority. Reld, That each of the three children is entitled to an equal
share, and that a contrary intention cannot be inferred from the testa-
tor's use of the word "between:" Ward v. Tompkins, 30 N. J. Eq.
